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Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP71B00508R000100100032-1

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EYES ONLY



27 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NRO ExCom Meeting of 26 August

1. Present were Secretary Vance, myself, Dr. Fubini, and Mr. Kiefer. Both Fubini and Vance had left a speech-writing meeting in order to hold the NRO ExCom meeting which lasted one hour.
2. Vance asked me if there was any unfinished business that we needed to discuss other than the FY '65 and '66 budgets. He stated his agreement that the [redacted] program was all agreed and squared away and he thought this was a great step forward. He felt that most of the NRO problems could eventually be solved by this type of informal discussion between Vance and McCone. I agreed in part but pointed out that the major problem with NRO was the attitude and the frustrations to the Agency that had been built up over the past several years, and a change in these relationships would not occur overnight. Vance agreed and said we should work toward these objectives.
3. I pointed out to Vance that the response from McMillan to Mr. McCone's budget memorandum clearly indicated the need for additional briefings for Mr. McCone, myself, and our advisers and that before proceeding with the remainder of the program, these briefings should be held. Vance agreed but asked specifically if there was anything on the budget that we might discuss today. I pointed out that if CIA is going to continue to contract for the CORONA payload, then funds should be available since present funds cover only the contracts that terminate in September and October of '64. Fubini stated that at previous meetings Mr. McCone had reluctantly agreed that since the majority wanted [redacted] as Systems Manager for CORONA, he had reluctantly gone along with it but pointing out his distaste

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
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NRO and OSD
review(s)
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for the procedure. Fubini said that the whole package for this exercise included the transfer of contracting responsibility to Greer and that was why the money had not been allocated to Program B. I stated that I felt it was essential that the high competence in satellites and missilery which the Agency has established be utilized in all pertinent NRO programs. Fubini denied that we had the competence, especially on the West Coast, and stated that to all intents and purposes the Agency was already out of the CORONA program. Kiefer reviewed the Coordination Board activities and Vance pointed out that this was an unsatisfactory arrangement for him and he wanted one individual who could be responsible to him and to Mr. McCone for a complete program. He thought that this should be Greer and that if it required Greer to do the contracting as well, then Greer should do it. Upon being questioned by Vance, Fubini pointed out that it was not absolutely necessary to transfer the contracting to Greer although it was probably neater to do so. Vance proposed that in order to utilize the CIA competence, the Agency establish a small group of people, say three, who would be attached to Greer's staff, who would have full knowledge of all of the CORONA program and would have access to all of it, who would provide Greer additional technical assistance in an advisory capacity, and that this small group could look directly back to the CIA satellite staff for additional advice and guidance or any help that they might need in assisting Greer. Fubini pointed out that this would also be a training camp in which CIA could augment its competence by assignment (say eight months, he said) to this small CIA component on Greer's staff. (This Vance proposal has considerable merit since it will put us back in the act insofar as knowing what's going on is concerned but also would appear to support our contention -- through Vance's remarks on Greer -- that we need a single manager for [REDACTED] and we have it.)

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4. Mr. Vance read from a memorandum for record dated 12 August by McMillan in which McMillan stated that Mr. McCone's agreement on accepting [REDACTED] as Systems Manager also

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included the contract changes as proposed in McMillan's original package. This was all news to me and I told Mr. Vance I would have to check it out with my records and with Mr. McCone. (See subsequent actions in this regard.) I stated also that I would take a look at the proposal to send personnel from the Agency out to be advisory to Greer.

5. I then mentioned that we continue to have problems as between the allocation of responsibility from NRO to Eastman Kodak and Westover, particularly since there appears to be a steadily increasing workload on Eastman Kodak while we are required to hold them to a fixed personnel ceiling. I said that this is a problem that must be resolved and that we would not be satisfied with budget allocations as indicated by NRO until we were satisfied that a delineation of workload and responsibilities was agreed by Mr. McCone. Dr. Fubini pointed out that, much to his horror, SAC was building a very fancy system for processing R-12 photography and that it had gone so far before he knew about it that he could not stop it. I made no comment.

6. I then stated that a decision must be made very soon as to whether we are going to convert SAC U-2's to CIA modifications for the CIA inventory or whether we were going to purchase U-2L's. Vance said he had already made the decision to replace SAC U-2's

that as far as he was concerned these U-2's should be modified to meet CIA needs. However, he said that what we needed first was a requirements study to indicate just what the needs were and that he had heard many varying figures. I pointed out that before we made the final decision on conversion or new production, I wanted the committee to hear the analysis we have made on this matter both as to requirements and as to costs and availabilities. Vance agreed to have this presented at the meeting next Tuesday and thought that it should also include consideration of the A-12 fleet. This meeting is tentatively set for Tuesday morning and I charged DD/S&T (OSA) with preparing an up-to-date briefing on this matter.

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8. I then referred to the letter that I had sent Mr. Vance reference speed trials using 121 or 129 and he agreed that from what I had said, this proposal would not work. In this connection, Fubini seemed miffed that Vance had not clued him in on my letter. I then told Vance that I was taking necessary action to ensure that the highest priority activities of the entire OXCART system would be placed on achieving an operational capability with four aircraft at mach 2.8/80,000 feet, refueling in flight, and operating [REDACTED] that nothing else in the program would be allowed to interfere with meeting this requirement. Vance agreed and Fubini pointed out that we should not be too arbitrary on the 2.8 mach since Kelly Johnson had told him he was having difficulty making this figure with that number of aircraft.

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Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

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HANDLE VIA [REDACTED]